Forum: Historical Security Council

Question of: The question of the Kashmir dispute (1948)

Student Officer: Heather Kwon, Assistant President

Introduction

Historical Causes & Overview

The Kashmir conflict is an ongoing territorial conflict over the Kashmir region, an area located between India and Pakistan. Kashmir was initially ruled by the Durrani Empire, an Afghan empire founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani, from 1752 until its conquest by the Sikh Empire, an empire originating in the Indian subcontinent founded by Ranjit Singh. In 1819, Gulab Singh, a vassal of the Sikh Empire, sent expeditions to a number of border kingdoms and ultimately succeeded in encircling Kashmir by 1840. Following the First Anglo-Sikh War, a conflict between the Sikh Empire and the British East India Company from 1845 to 1846 in which the Sikh Empire faced defeat and partial subjugation, Kashmir was conceded to the East India Company under the Treaty of Lahore. However, it was later transferred to Gulab Singh under the Treaty of Amritsar in return for indemnity owed by the Sikh Empire, resulting in Gulab claiming the title of Maharaja of both Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently, Kashmir was ruled by Gulab's Dogra Dynasty as a princely state under British paramountcy, being subject to suzerainty of the British Crown, from 1846 to 1947.

In 1947, the partition of India took place, in which the state of British India was officially divided into two independent successor nations, India and Pakistan. This was a product of the tension between Hindus and Muslims as well as their inability to come to a consensus on the rules imposed on them by the British, ending the British paramountcy over the 562 Indian princely states.³ The Indian Independence Act of 1947 allowed all states within British India to choose whether to join India or Pakistan, or to remain independent.⁴ Pakistan made numerous efforts to persuade Kashmir to join its nation; for instance, in July 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan, allegedly wrote to the Maharaja promising favorable

¹ BBC. "The Partition of India: What happened?" BBC. Last modified December 6, 2018. Accessed July 9, 2022. https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/46428985.

² Snedden, Christopher. *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris*. N.p.: Oxford University Press, 2015.

³ Creative Commons Attribution. "India Regional Kashmir conflict." Acaps. Last modified April 7, 2022. Accessed July 11, 2022.

⁴ "Indian Independence Act." India Legislation. Last modified 1947. Accessed July 11, 2022. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1947/30/pdfs/ukpga_19470030_en.pdf.

treatment in the case of accession. Nevertheless, because Jammu and Kashmir had a predominantly Muslim population while being ruled by Hindu Hari Singh at the time, it decided to remain an independent state to avoid the Muslims' dissatisfaction with accession to India and the Hindus' vulernability in joining Pakistan.⁵

This indecision on accession led to various conflicts between the Muslim League party and state authorities, many of which were armed. For instance, the violence in the Jammu region that began in September of 1947 developed into a widespread massacre of Muslims by October. Simultaneously, both India and Pakistan were growing impatient with the indecision; in an effort to secure Kashmir before India, Pakistan orchestrated an invasion of the region on October 22, 1947, beginning the first of four Kashmir wars. As a result of the aforementioned internal rebellion from the pro-Pakistan population that the Maharaja's forces were already preoccupied with, they were unprepared and easily routed by the Pakistan military. India refused to provide the Maharaja military assistance and send its troops unless it acceded to India; thus, on October 26, 1947, the Maharaja officially signed an instrument of accession.⁶

This decision was faced with discontent from the Gilgit Agency, an agency established by the British Indian Empire in the northern part of the Jammu and Kashmir regions; hence, on November 1, 1947, Major William Brown, commander of the Gilgit Scouts, overthrew Governor Ghansara Singh through a bloodless coup d'etat. Major Brown then implemented his pro-Pakistan measures, contacting Abdul Qayyum Khan, Chief Minister of the North-West Frontier Province, and asking for Pakistan to take over Jammu and Kashmir. On November 7, Pakistani soldiers captured Rajouri, a union territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which caused the Rajouri Massacre of more than 30,000 Hindus. At the same time, India's leadership was fully convinced that Singh's signature on the instrument of accession gave India the moral and legal right to the entirety of Kashmir; this belief was further amplified by the fact that India was able to halt the advancement of Pakistan's forces with its own troops, heightening political tensions and military violence between India and Pakistan. However, with the weather conditions preventing further campaigning from both parties, Indian Prime Minister Nehru called upon the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to mediate the situation. On January 1, 1948, in a letter to the UNSC, Nehru wrote,

⁵ Ankit, Rakesh. Henry Scott: The forgotten soldier of Kashmir. N.p.: Epilogue, 2017.

⁶ "Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir." Committee to Protect Journals. Last modified October 27, 1947. Accessed July 11, 2022.

https://cjp.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/instrument of accession of jammu and kashmir state.pdf.

⁷ Lyon, Peter. Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An Encylopedia. N.p.: ABC-CLIO, 2008.

"Under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, any member may bring any situation, whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders...are drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which acceded to the Dominion of India...The Government of India requests the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put to an end immediately...[this] act of aggression against India."8

On January 15, Pakistan responded with its own letter to the UNSC, rejecting India's claims and highlighting its own stance pertaining to Kashmir and India's conduct. Despite a myriad of attempts by the UN to mediate (elaborated upon in **previous efforts & UN failures**), combat operations resumed in February, and the first Kashmir war lasted until January 5, 1949. A multitude of subsequent military conflicts followed, including the 1950 military standoff, Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1999, before coming to a temporary end on July 26, 1999.

Impact

There are a plethora of impacts of the Kashmir dispute. Regarding the humanitarian aspect, it has resulted in war crimes being committed by Indian authorities; Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that "Indian forces in Kashmir have engaged in massive human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions, rape, torturem and deliberate assault on health care workers." Further, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported an insurmountable number of civilian massacres, shootings of unarmed protestors, extrajudicial killings, unlawful detentions, and cases of torture, sexual violence, and vandalism of civilian goods and properties. A total of approximately 100,000 civilians have died since 1989, and 75,000 to 100,000 individuals have been temporarily displaced every year.

Furthermore, Indian security forces have made excessive use of the pellet-shotgun as a weapon to control the protestors in Jammu and Kashmir, culminating in eyesight loss and physical injuries of civilians. They have also employed rape as a weapon to terrorize such protestors, however with impunity, have faced no investigations or consequences. Most infamously, in 1992, 23 women were sexually assaulted by security forces personnel in the town of Shopian.

⁹ Human Rights Watch. "Kashmir: UN Reports Serious Abuses." Human Rights Watch. Last modified July 10, 2019. Accessed July 11, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/10/kashmir-un-reports-serious-abuses.

⁸ United Nations Security Council. "Letter from the Representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 1 January 1948." United Nations Digital Library. Last modified January 1, 1948. Accessed July 11, 2022. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/468605?ln=en.

In addition, the war has created economic implications for both India and Pakistan; Pakistan has been suspended from India's supply of medicine and cotton, the total economic losses to India caused by the dispute is estimated at \$1.4 billion. Both nations continue to risk financial consequences such as the disproportionate effect, increased debt, and increased defense spending.

Finally, the conflict has an impact on the global and regional security and peace of South Asia, as India and Pakistan are both states that have yet to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT.) India has developed a strong indigenous nuclear infrastructure and has the capability to produce thermonuclear weapons, whereas Pakistan has an abundance of highly enriched uranium and Al-Khalid MBT, newly developed tanks. This arms race through the increasing acquisition of nuclear weapons by the two nations continues to threaten security and coalition among South Asian states.

Previous Efforts & UN Failures

There were numerous efforts made by the UN during the time in an attempt to alleviate the violence. On January 20, 1948, the UNSC passed resolution 39, establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP.)¹¹ The UNCIP was to investigate the status quo on ground, effectively act as a mediator between India and Pakistan, and ultimately resolve the dispute. As combat continued, the UNSC passed a more detailed resolution 47 on April 21, 1948, which called upon Pakistan to secure the withdrawal of its proxies and India to withdraw its troops. It also established a temporary Plebiscite Administration in Kashmir, which would conduct a "fair and impartial plebiscite on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan," which was followed by the UNCIP being expanded and dispatched to the region. However, by the time the UNCIP arrived in July, the Pakistan Army had already started to push back Indian troops; Pakistan completely disregarded the resolution's call for a ceasefire and withdrawal.

The UN then passed another resolution on August 13, 1948, which proposed that both sides issue a ceasefire and truce overseen by the UN; however, this was also unsuccessful as the document failed to reiterate the specific means for resolving the dispute mentioned in resolution 47. Although India and Pakistan did agree to a ceasefire on January 1, 1949, the UNCIP was unable to create a consensus on aspects such as demilitarizing Kashmir and conducting the plebiscite due to differences between the two

¹⁰ Pandow, Bilal. "Economics of Kashmir Conflict." *Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies*, 2020. https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol40/iss1/11/.

¹¹ United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 39." United Nations Digital Library. Last modified January 20, 1948. Accessed July 11, 2022. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/39.

¹² Pakistan Mission to the United Nations. "UN Resolutions on Jammu & Kashmir." Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United States, Geneva. Accessed July 11, 2022. https://www.pakungeneva.pk/ContentPage.aspx?ID=20.

nations over interpretation of the procedure and purpose for demilitarization. The first and arguably most paramount failure at this stage is that there was limited communication between the UNCIP and the two nations as well as between the nations; India interpreted the plebiscite as a means to confirm Kashmir's accession to its nation, whereas Pakistan believed that the Maharaja no longer had authority to execute accession. Second, the UNCIP failed to involve a third party, choosing to recognize India and Pakistan as the only parties and thus deferring to the norm of state sovereignty. It neglected the importance of Kashmiri authorities, failing to consult or engage with the prominent political actors within Kashmir itself, let alone mention or elaborate upon any discussions or observations within such political interactions. In fact, the UNCIP avoided indirectly bestowing any legitimacy upon the Kashmir officials, and did not attempt to meet, interview, or correspond with Maharaja Hari Singh. Another significant failure is that the UN did not deal with the underlying issues of the conflict; it considered the conflict to simply be a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, and did not countenance any option of independence for Kashmir, which is what the state seeked since the Indian partition in 1947, denying the state an opportunity for self-determination.

In January of 1949, the UNCIP established the UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, as well as report any developments in the observance of the ceasefire. However, there was no specific resolution created and passed on the development of its role, causing the Secretary-General at the time to be left to direct it arbitrarily. The sole purpose of the peacekeeping force was to monitor a ceasefire that did not take place instead of being assigned to achieve a political solution to the conflict or enforce peace; the troops did not militarily intervene in the armed conflict and protect civilians. Subsequently, the UNMOGIP outlived its usefulness when it became clear that India was unwilling to comply with the plebiscite and the opportunity for mediating the political solution was closing.

In December, the UNCIP submitted its final report to the UNSC in which it acknowledged its failure to mediate the conflict and convince them to demilitarize. Thus, the UNSC appointed a group of individual representatives with greater flexibility to mediate between India and Pakistan while implementing the plebiscite. Among this group, Owen Dixon, Australian diplomat, proposed a modified plan for the plebiscite detailed in resolution 47, in which Kashmir would be partitioned. However, this

¹³ Westcott, Stephen. "The Case of UN Involvement in Jammu and Kashmir." E-international Relations. Last modified May 29, 2020. Accessed July 11, 2022.

¹⁴ Williams, Paul. *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. N.p.: Oxford University Press, 2013.

was rejected by Pakistan as it refused to divert from the original plebiscite plan in resolution 47; the UN had already proposed too many varying, ineffective solutions that both nations grew skeptical of the UNCIP in its entirety. The UN then appointed two more representatives, who tried to induce the increasingly disinterested Indian and Pakistan to demiliaritize Kashmir instead of engaging local Kashmiri authorities.

The UN then passed resolution 122 in January of 1957, which outlined the UN's frustration with the lack of progress in the plebiscite. However, the UN remained unwilling to place emphasis on the issue through measures such as imposing sanctions; this was further demonstrated in 1958, when the UN refused to appoint another representative for the issue and effectively stopped discussing the issue as a whole.¹⁵

There are also a number of failures pertaining to the humanitarian aspect; first, the UN failed to establish safe zones and refugee camps in the earlier stages of the dispute. Thus, the civilians and protestors were not provided shelter and protection admist a consistently virulent environment when the first invasion by the Pakistani army occurred. In addition, the UN failed to find a means to collect and publish evidence of war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law within the Kashmir region to increase transparency and accountability from both India and Pakistan.

*For the sake of the committee, the time period for debate in the HSC will be set to before January 20, 1948, and thus before the listed **UN failures.**

There were also a range of previous efforts made to resolve the dispute outside of the UN, namely a series of attempted settlement formulas. The Rajaji-Abdulla formula, named after Chakravarti Rajagopalachari and Sheikh Abdulla, was "an honorable solution which would not give a sense of victory either to India or Pakistan and at the same time would ensure a place of honor to the people of Kashmir." It principally suggested a condominium, shared government, confederation, and UN trust territory, with Adbulla acting as the mediator between India and Pakistan. However, the idea was never made public and was declared absurd. The Chenab formula, proposed in 2005, assigned Ladakh to India and Gilgit-Baltistan to Pakistan, suggested a plebiscite in the Kashmir Valley, and split Jammu into

¹⁵ Hussain, Mehmood and Mehmood, Sumara. "Genocide in Kashmir and the United Nations Failure to Invoke Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Causes and Consequences" *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights* 18, no. 1 (2021): 55-77. https://doi.org/10.1515/mwjhr-2020-0017

¹⁶ Hussain, Masood. "Those 4 Days." *Kashmir Life*, 2015, www.kashmirlife.net/those-4-days-issue-11-volume-07-79972/.

two-halves. However, the formula was later denied by the Pakistani government and interfered by the Mumbai attacks in 2008.

Major Issues/Problems Faced

There are various issues in relation to the fundamental clauses of the Kashmir conflict that have made the problem so difficult to resolve, with the most pertinent being the historical complexity of the Kashmir region, having been under the possession of the Durrani Empire, Sikh Empire, East India Company, Dogra Dynasty, and India, despite seeking sovereignty. This complexity involves the initial religious tensions between Hinduism and Islam that act as the paramount cause for the current political animosity between India and Pakistan; thus, both parties are inevitably nationalistic and reluctant in trusting one another and coming to a compromise. As a consequence, by the time that the aforementioned solutions were implemented by the UN, the conflict had already escalated to an unmanageable extent and violence was far too pertinent for the efforts to be effective.

Another factor to consider would be the series of military conflicts that took place during the time and had a fairly large impact on the Kashmir dispute such as the Cold War, where the US announced in 1954 that it would provide military aid to Pakistan, which contributed to Nehru's hostility, and ultimately his withdrawal from the plebiscite.¹⁷

Furthermore, a constant issue faced in Kashmir at the time was the lack of transparency from both the UN and the Indian and Pakistani governments, which allowed security forces to continue to blatantly exercise war crimes and significant violations of international humanitarian law with impunity. This is demonstrated through the lack of sufficient statistics on ground as well as documented accounts of witnessed violations.

Definition of Key Terms

IDP (Internally Displaced Person)

An internally displaced person is someone who has been forced to leave their home but remains within the nation's borders, usually as a result of armed conflict.¹⁸ The insurgency in the Kashmir region has culminated in the internal displacement of approximately 90% of Hindu Kashmiri Pandits, an estimated

¹⁷ Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan, and the un-ending war, N.p.; I.B. Tauris, 2003.

¹⁸ "Internal Displacement." *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, www.unocha.org/es/themes/internal-displacement#:~:text=Internally%20displaced%20persons%20(IDPs)%20are,re main%20within%20their%20own%20country.

250,000-300,000 individuals; a vast majority of such people have resettled in areas in India within close proximity.

Plebiscite

A plebiscite is the direct vote of all members of an electorate on a prevailing public question or proposal, often to implement a major reform in the nation's system or state. In the context of the Kashmir conflict, the UN attempted to hold a plebiscite as a means of conflict resolution, a vote on the question of India's accession to either India or Pakistan.¹⁹

War Crime

A war crime is a violation of the international humanitarian law that highlights individual criminal responsibility for the actions of a country or its soldiers; this can include intentionally killing civilians, taking hostages, and sexual harassment. As aforementioned, both the HRW and the United States state department reported that the Indian army stationed in Kashmir continuously carried out extrajudicial killings of civilians and suspected insurgents; over 2,000 testimonies of violence and war crimes by Indian forces have been documented throughout the conflict.²⁰

Military Standoff

A military standoff is a state in which both forces involved are fixed in their respective position and space, and are unwilling to move, often keeping two nations on the verge of war for an extended period of time. There have been a number of military standoffs between India and Pakistan, including the 1950 military standoff where a large portion of the Indian Army was concentrated on the Indo-Pakistan border, as well as the 2001 standoff that resulted in the massing of troops from both India and Pakistan.²¹

Collective Punishment

Collective punishment is a form of retaliation in which the group surrounding a suspected perpetrator, including their family, friends, acquaintances, and classmates, are targeted. A prominent form of collective punishment of the people of Jammu and Kashmir is the "blackout," in which residents within

¹⁹ "Plebiscite Conundrum." Kashmir Library. Last modified January 5, 1949. Retrieved November 11, 2012. https://web.archive.org/web/20200202183820/http://www.kashmirlibrary.org/kashmir_timeline/kashmir_chapters/plebiscite.shtml.

²⁰ United Nations. "War Crimes." *United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,* www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml.

²¹ Brecher, Michael. *The Struggle for Kashmir*, N.p.: Ryerson Press, 1953.

the area are cut off from all mobile phones, television channels, and internet access without a pretext of precipitating offense.²²

Impunity

Impunity is the exemption from punishment from the consequences of an action, and often refers to the act of government, high-ranking, military, or police officials to avoid punishment for major crimes such as civilian kidnappings and killings. Indian security personnel stationed in Kashmir have faced no discipline for their blatant abuse of power and civilians; this culture of official impunity continues to prevail today.²³

Separatism

Separatism is the belief and practice of separation of a specific group of individuals from a larger body of people on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or gender.²⁴ The Muslim population often exhibited separatism through its act of rebellion against the Hindu government officials and thus their decision to accede to India in 1947.

Accession

Accession is the act of joining or entering upon, ultimately coming into the possession of a title or becoming a part of an entity.²⁵ Initial tensions between India and Pakistan became prevalent when Kashmir was left with the decision of accession to either nation, and further, when the Maharaja failed to accede to a certain nation in a timely manner.

Princely State

A princely state is a nominally sovereign entity of the British Indian Empire that was directly governed by an Indian ruler however subject to suzerainty of the British crown under British paramountcy, thus being indirectly under the rule of the British. Jammu and Kashmir were the two largest of the 584 princely states in India at the time.²⁶

²² Kumar, Sanjay. *Kashmir's communication blackout is a 'devastating blow' for academics, researchers say.* American Association for the Advancement of Science. Last modified September 19, 2019.

²³ Simon & Schuster. *Impunity must end in Jammu and Kashmir*. Amnesty International. Last modified June, 2021. www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/asa200232001en.pdf.

²⁴ Oxford Languages. "Separatism." Google's English Dictionary, www.languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/. Accessed 30 Jun. 2022.

²⁵ Oxford Languages. "Accession." Google's English Dictionary, www.languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/. Accessed 30 Jun. 2022.

²⁶ Menon, Vapal. *Transfer of Power in India*. N.p.: Sangam Books, 2015.

Soft Border

A soft border can be defined as a permeable, non-militarized border between states in which people and goods are able to pass through fairly easily.²⁷ A soft border approach is an increasingly suggested solution to the Kashmir dispute, where permeable borders would be made between Kashmir and both India and Pakistan, unlike the rest of the Indo-Pakistan border.

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TICPI)

The TICPI is a method used to evaluate the extent to which a nation is corrupt according to experts and businesspeople; it was created by Transparency International in 1995, and essentially ranks the perceived levels of public sector corruption of countries on a yearly basis.²⁸ In 1999 when the fourth Kashmir war occurred, India ranked 72nd out of 99 countries with a score of 2.9 on a scale of 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 10 (perceived to have little corruption), and Pakistan ranked 87th with a score of 2.2.

Timeline of Key Events

First Kashmir War - October 22, 1947 - January 5, 1949

On October 22, 1947, Pakistan precipitated the war by launching militias from Waziristan, a region in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, in an attempt to capture Kashmir and preemptively prevent the possibility of its accession to India.²⁹ Because the state forces that were stationed at the border were already occupied with Muslim separatist rebels, they were quickly defeated by Pakistani tribal forces, thus allowing the way to the capital to be open. The Pakistan Army remained in the captured cities along the border, engaging in looting and the murdering of Hindu and Sikh civilians in Jammu and Kashmir, instead of advancing toward Srinagar. Once the instrument of accession was signed on October 26, India airlifted its troops and military equipment to Srinagar, where they established a defense perimeter and defeated the tribal forces on the border. Although Indian forces successfully captured Uri and Baramulla, the Pakistani tribal forces captured areas such as Jhanger, Naoshera, and Mirpur, leading to the 1947 Mirpur massacre, in which Hindu women were abducted and taken into Pakistan. The war ended on January 5 when a ceasefire was proclaimed through UN mediation. Indian losses in the First Kashmir war totalled 1,104 deaths and 3,154 wounded, whereas Pakistan totalled 6,000

²⁷ Mostov, Julie. Soft Borders. N.p.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

²⁸ "CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX." *Transparency International*, 1948, www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2009. Accessed 17 Mar. 2022.

²⁹ Ministry of Defense, Government of India. *Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948*. N.p.: Thomson Press (India), 1987.

deaths and 14,000 wounded; India seized control of approximately ²/₃ of Kashmir, and Pakistan the remaining ¹/₃.³⁰

Rajouri Massacre - November 7, 1947 - April 12, 1948

The Rajouri Massacre refers to the killing of approximately 30,000 residents and refugees in the Rajouri tehsil of Jammu and Kashmir, and began on November 7, when the Pakistani Army, accompanied by separatist rebels, captured Rajouri. Upon entering the city, they looted, slaughtered, raped, abducted, and sold thousands of Hindus and Sikhs. Although civilians armed with traditional weapons attempted to engage in combat, their weapons were not able to support them for a long period of time, and most of such individuals died. Rajouri was left in this state for months until April 12, 1948, when Rajouri was recaptured by the Indian Army and freed from terror. The Rajouri Massacre is a paradigm of the virulence within Kashmir during the First Kashmir War.

UN Mediation - January 20, 1948 - January 1957

The UN's advisory role in maintaining peace and order in the Kashmir region began when Indian Prime Minister Nehru wrote a letter to the UNSC requesting mediation of the situation. The UN adopted numerous resolutions in an attempt to respond to and resolve the conflict, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 39, which established the UNCIP to investigate and share evidence within the Security Council about the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, UNSCR 47, which introduced the idea of an impartial plebiscite as the means to decide the accession of Kashmir to India and Pakistan, and UNSCR 51, which expressed the need for a ceasefire overseen by the UN in resolving the dispute and maintaining international peace and security. Following resolutions such as UNSCR 80, UNSCR 91, UNSCR 98, and UNSCR 122 simply reaffirmed that the question of accession would be decided through the plebiscite, which proved to be ineffective as elaborated upon previously. The UN also established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor the ceasefire line agreed upon in the Karachi Agreement, a military treaty signed in July of 1949 by India and Pakistan.³²

Operation Gibraltar - August 5, 1965

Operation Gibraltar is the codename of a military operation planned and executed by the Pakistan Army in Jammu and Kashmir; it aimed to covertly cross the Line of Control (LoC), a military control line

³⁰ Singh, Maj Gen Jagjit. With Honour & Glory: Wars fought by India 1947-1999. N.p.: Lancer Publishers, 2000.

³¹ Jammu Kashmir Now. "12 April 1948; When Rajouri was reclaimed by Indian Army; Story of Rajouri Massacre." Jammu Kashmir Now. Last modified April 12, 2022. Accessed July 11, 2022. https://www.jammukashmirnow.com/Encyc/2022/4/12/12-April-1948-When-Rajouri-was-reclaimed-by-Indian-Arm y-Story-of-Story-of-Rajouri-Massacre.html.

³² United Nations. "United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan." United Nations Peacekeeping. www.peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmogip.

between the Indian and Pakistani controlled regions of Kashmir, and support the Muslim population's uprising against the Indian government.³³ On August 5, approximately 30,000 Pakistani troops disguised themselves as locals and crossed the LoC, entering the Indian-administered portion of Jammu and Kashmir with the objective of instigating an insurgency in the Kashmir Valley.³⁴ However, the troops' presence was soon disclosed to the Indian Army, which responded by deploying additional troops in the Kashmir Valley and beginning its assault against infiltrators in the region. This led to the Pakistan military launching Operation Grand Slam, a major offensive in attacking the lifeline of an infantry division of the Indian Army, sparking the Second Kashmir War.

Second Kashmir War - September 1, 1965 - September 23, 1965

On September 1, Operation Grand Slam was launched, where Pakistan was able to effectively commit direct offenses against Indian forces, who were unprepared and thus suffered significant losses.³⁵ This resulted in a series of retaliations between the Indian and Pakistani Army, calling in their respective air forces to attack air bases in Kashmir, which ultimately forced the Pakistan forces to relocate its troops, thus causing Operation Grand Slam to fail. Indian troops then progressed further south, forcing out Pakistani infiltrators and later crossing the International Border on September 6. Conflict continued with a series of operations such Operation Windup as well as hostilities such as the Battle of Asal Uttar until September 23, ending in a stalemate. The war was generally a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan, as it was unsuccessful in both fomenting insurrection in Kashmir as well as gaining support internationally. Furthermore, the Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, whereas Pakistan suffered 3,800; the Indian Army gained possession of 1,920 square kilometers of Pakistani territory, while the Pakistan army 550 square kilometers of Indian territory.³⁶

Third Kashmir War - December 3, 1971 - December 16, 1971

The Third Kashmir War was a military confrontation between India and Pakistan that occurred during the Bangladesh Liberation War, and began on December 3 with Pakistan's Operation Chengiz Khan, which sent preemptive aerial strikes on 11 Indian air stations.³⁷ This led to countless battles

³³ Fair, Christine. "The Militant Challenge in Pakistan." *Asia Policy*, 11: 105-137, doi:10.1353/asp.2011.0010.

³⁴ Junaid, Mohamad. "Kashmir: A Historical Timeline." Adi Magazine. Last modified 2020. Accessed July 11, 2022. https://adimagazine.com/articles/kashmir-a-historical-timeline/.

³⁵ Haqqani, Husain. "Pakistn's Endgame in Kashmir." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Last modified on July 1, 2003. www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1427.

³⁶ Grover, Verinder. 50 Years of Indo-Pak Relations: Chronology of events, important documents, 1947-1997. N.p.: Deep and Deep Publications. 1998.

³⁷ Zakaria, Anam. "Remembering the war of 1971 in East Pakistan." Al Jazeera Media Network. Last modified on December 16, 2019.

www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/12/16/remembering-the-war-of-1971-in-east-pakistan.

between the Pakistani Air Forces (PAF) and Indian Air Forces (IAF) over conflict zones as well as retaliations such as the PAF bombing of Okha harbor and the destroying of Indian fuel tanks. The Indian Army responded by conducting successful air raids into West Pakistan such as its attack on the Pakistani base in Murid, which destroyed five aircrafts; the Indian Army also carried out ground operations, penetrating Pakistani soil and capturing around 15,000 square kilometers of Pakistani territory. By December 16, it was clear that India achieved the upper hand in the conflict, and thus the Pakistan military signed the instrument of surrender and called for a unilateral ceasefire; approximately 93,000 Pakistani servicemen were imprisoned by the Indian Army, including uniformed personnel and civilians. Pakistan suffered 8,000 deaths and 25,000 wounded, while India suffered 3,000 deaths and 12,000 wounded.³⁸

Simla Agreement - July 2, 1972

The Simla Agreement is a peace treaty between India and Pakistan signed on July 2, 1972 in Shimla following the Third Kashmir War. The treaty aimed to serve as a means for both nations to "put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations, conceive the steps to be taken for the normalization of Indo-Pakistan relations, and define the principles that would govern their future interactions." The agreement's major outcomes include that the two countries will "settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations" and that "neither side shall seek to alter [the ceasefire] unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations." However, the agreement was largely unsuccessful in implementing such measures and preventing the relationship between India and Pakistan from further deterioration, which is most notably demonstrated in the Kargil War that followed.

Kargil War - May 3, 1999 - July 26, 1999

On May 3, Pakistan forces invaded the Kargil district, a portion of the western Ladakh union territory in northwestern India, occupying strategic locations and bringing National Highway 1 within range of its artillery fire.⁴⁰ Upon discovering the infiltration, the Indian Army sent out troops from the Kashmir Valley to Kargil district, beginning airstrikes against Pakistani positions. This resulted in a large-scale conflict between the Indian and Pakistani air forces, including shelling operations from the Pakistani Army that shot down multiple Indian aircrafts such as an IAF MiG-21 and MiG-27. The Indian Army then began a major offensive in Kargil, effectively recapturing a majority of the territories,

³⁸ Leonard, Thomas, *Encylopedia of the developing world*, vol. 1. N.p.: Taylor & Francis, 2006.

³⁹ Cohen, Stephen. "India, Pakistan and Kashmir." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2002. doi:10.1080/01402390412331302865,S2CID154265853.

⁴⁰ Nanda, Colonel Ravi. Kargil: A Wake Up Call. N.p.: Vedams Books, 2007.

including two key positions in the Batalik sector and securing Tololing after major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces. On July 5, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif officially announced the Pakistani Army's withdrawal from Kargil following a meeting with President Bill Clinton; on July 26, the Indian Army announced the complete withdrawal of Pakistani forces.

Shopian Rape And Murder - May 29-30, 2009

On May 29, two Kashmiri women, 17-year old Asiya and her 22-year old sister-in-law Neelofer, went missing from their orchard in South Kashmir's Shopian district; their bodies were found in a nearby stream the following morning. While the villagers alleged that the women were raped and murdered by government forces, the police claimed on May 30 that the "post-mortem conducted revealed no marks on the bodies, including private parts." Additionally, the Indian government claimed that the women drowned in a stream and effectively closed the investigation. However, an independent investigation by the Jam Commission confirmed the civilians' allegations, finding that the women were raped by Indian forces. This led to widespread protests that lasted months, demanding justice, self-determination, and removal of the Indian forces, and further exacerbating tensions within the Kashmir area.

Position of Key Member Nations and Other Bodies

India

India believes the Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to be confirmation of Kashmir being an integral part of India, and thus requested UN mediation with the purpose of calling upon Pakistan to cease its aggression against India. Hence, India raised objections to UNSC Resolution 47 as it disregarded its complaint of Pakistani aggression and because the plebiscite undermined the sovereignty of Kashmir. India maintains the view that Pakistan is attempting to foster anti-India sentiment within the Kashmiri people through false propaganda, and has repeatedly accused Pakistan of engaging in a proxy war in the region by supplying military and financial assistance to local terrorist groups. Further, it believes that the insurgency and violence in Kashmir is a ramification of Pakistan's deliberate effort to create instability in the area. In terms of solutions to the dispute, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has stated that all indifferences between India and Pakistan must be settled through bilateral negotiations and mutual dialogue, as agreed upon under the Simla Agreement in 1972, without the need for a plebiscite. India is open to accommodating the political demands of the people of Kashmir, with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressing his government's willingness to grant autonomy to the

⁴¹ "Asiya, Neelofar rape & murder: No justice to victims as a decade passes." Greater Kashmir. Last modified on May 29, 2019.

www.greaterkashmir.com/kashmir/asiya-neelofar-rape-murder-no-justice-to-victims-as-a-decade-passes.

region if there was a consensus between political parties regarding the conflict.⁴² Finally, India is generally in opposition of the two-nation theory, an ideology stating that Indian Muslims and Indian Hindus are two distinct nations, and that Kashmir should ideally be a part of Pakistan as it has a Muslim-majority population.

Pakistan

Pakistan believes that Kashmir is the "jugular vein of Pakistan," however has stated that the final status of the disputed territory must be determined by the Kashmiri people. 43 It uses this very stance to reason that the insurgency in Kashmir is a symbol of Kashmiri people no longer wishing to remain in India. The government has also claimed that Indian forces were in Kashmir prior to the Instrument of Accession, and thus that India violated the Standstill Agreement, signed to maintain the status quo in Kashmir. Pakistan holds that the view of the Maharaja of Kashmir has no authority to make decisions such as calling upon the Indian Army as he is not a hereditary ruler and merely a British appointee. The government has brought light to the widespread extrajudicial killings by Indian security forces in Indian-administered Kashmir. Regarding solutions, Pakistan's current National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz has stated that Pakistan wished to have third party mediation on the conflict. Pakistan previously objected to any number of Indian forces being located in Kashmir, and called for an equal representation in the government of the state.

China

China has generally been in support of Pakistan throughout the conflict as a result of the historical tensions between China and India originating from the Sino-Indian border dispute. China refused to accept the boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir, and to this day claims Aksai Chin, a territory in the Kashmir region.⁴⁴ Although China's policy has transitioned from an entirely pro-Pakistani stance to a more neutral one between the two nations since the 1980s, because the time period for debate in the HSC is 1948, the delegate of China should mostly pertain to the pro-Pakistani stance. Generally, China has prioritized the prevention of war between the two nations over its political considerations, urging India and Pakistan to respect the LoC in an attempt to maintain the status quo. China aided the UN and Russia

⁴² Bennett, Coleman & Co. "BJP questions PM's Kashmir autonomy remark." The Times of India. Last modified August 11, 2010. Accessed July 11, 2022.

 $https://archive.ph/20120712071508/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-08-11/india/28297162_1_auton omy-jammu-and-kashmir-bjp-questions.$

⁴³ "Kashmir jugular vein of Pakistan: Durrani." Dawn. Last modified December 16, 2006. https://www.dawn.com/news/223610.

⁴⁴ Chang, Jennifer. "China's Kashmir Policies and Crisis Management in South Asia." United States Institute of Peace. Last modified February 9, 2017. Accessed July 11, 2022.

https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/02/chinas-kashmir-policies-and-crisis-management-south-asia.

in coordinating mediation between the two states, advising both nations to resolve all issues in a peaceful manner.

United States of America

Because India and Pakistan are both possessors of nuclear weapons, the US wanted to settle the Kashmir dispute promptly before the 1998 nuclear tests; however, it was unwilling to spend the political capacity necessary to do so. 45 The US' longstanding position on solutions is that Kashmir's status must be settled through discourse and negotiations between India and Pakistan while considering the interests of the people of Kashmir, seeking to prevent hostilities from further escalating to interstate war. Thus, the US strived to avoid actions that overtly favored either nation with the intent of staying disengaged from the contention. However, with the Cold War evolving in 1948 and India becoming increasingly friendly towards the Soviet Union, the US focused its partnership with Pakistan. In February of 1954, the US officially approved military assistance for Pakistan, which perpetuated a regional defense organization. With resolution 47, the US accepted the Pakistani view that Kashmir's accession to India was incomplete and that Kashmir was regardless a disputed territory between the two parties.

Russian Federation

Russia's blatant support for India in the Kashmir dispute is rooted in history: when Soviet Union leader Nikita Khrushchev visited India in 1995, he infamously remarked, "We are so near that if ever you call us from the mountain tops we will appear at your side." This is the idea that shaped Soviet support for India in the initial stages of the conflict and continues to define Russian support for India at UN discussions. The Soviet Union, at the time of the first UNSC resolutions, was the only nation that vetoed resolutions that seeked UN or international interventions in Kashmir, insisting that the dispute is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, and must be solved through direct negotiations involving India and Pakistan. Given this, Russia holds that the "use of force to settle disputes is impermissible", and that they "must be resolved by way of peaceful talks."

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom plays an integral role in the dispute as a whole, as Kashmir, along with the other 561 princely states, were under British paramountcy until 1947; the end of British rule over British India allowed for such princely states to accede to either India or Pakistan. The government has

⁴⁵ Behera, Navnita. "Kashmir: Redefining the U.S. Role." Brookings. Last modified October 30, 2022. Accessed July 11, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/research/kashmir-redefining-the-u-s-role/.

⁴⁶ Simon, Sheldon W. "The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective." *Asian Survey* 7, no. 3 (1967): 176–87. https://doi.org/10.2307/2642236.

communicated its concern about increasing tensions between India and Pakistan and the need to address the underlying issues of the conflict, but has avoided favoring one nation over the other or playing an intermediary role in the Kashmir issue despite its initial involvement. As violence progressed, the UK expressed its support for the aforementioned proposed American assistance to Pakistan in extending arms assistance. Following India's discontent with this, the British government then informed India that the move was "undoubtedly not directed against India." The UK essentially possesses a neutral stance and is more inclined towards an uncontroversial solution to the issue.

France

France is also among the nations that have consistently voiced that the Kashmir conflict is for India and Pakistan to resolve in the framework of their bilateral negotiations. In 1947, France established diplomatic relations with the newly independent India in 1947, and in 1948, the two countries signed an agreement that stipulated that the inhabitants of France's Indian possessions would determine their political future. France did not have an established relationship with Pakistan in 1948, as foreign relations were first established between the two nations in 1951 when an agreement to open embassy services in one another's country was signed. Emmanuel Bonne, Advisor to French President Emmanuel Macron, stated in 2021 that France has always openly supported India on the agenda of the Kashmir dispute. He also noted that during UNSC meetings, France did not "let China play any kind of procedural game" in clear support of India, forming a sense of animosity between the two nations in discussions.

Bangladesh

The national stance of Bangladesh on the Kashmir conflict is fairly complicated due to the complex religion divides within the nation. Bangladeshi Muslims have advocated for the independence of Kashmir or accession to Pakistan, while Bangladeshi Hindus wish for Kashmir to remain an Indian state. The government believes Jammu and Kashmir to be an internal issue of India, and is in support of maintaining regional peace and stability as a priority in Kashmir. Leading up to 1948, Bangladesh established diplomatic relations with both India and Pakistan due to the partition of Bengal into the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan, thus retaining a balanced stance between the two countries.

⁴⁷ ISHRA, ANAND SHANKAR. "BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF MILITARY ALLIANCES IN ASIA, 1953-1956." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 4 (1978): 599–619. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41854878.

⁴⁸ DNA. "France lends support to India over Kashmir issue, says didn't let China play any games in UNSC." Dna. Last modified January 8, 2021. Accessed July 11, 2022.

https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-france-lends-support-to-india-over-kashmir-issue-says-didn-t-let-china-play-any-games-in-unsc-2866680.

Egypt

Egypt has maintained close relations with both India and Pakistan; it has exhibited the idea that discourse between India and Pakistan is the only solution to the Kashmir conflict instead of a military intervention, and has further expressed its wish for deeper ties with India. Sameh Shoukry, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, has stated that Egypt continues to advocate for "a balanced relationship with all our international partners on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in their internal affairs," and supports "peaceful resolution of all conflicts through diplomatic means and dialogue and continue to advocate against any form of military intervention or conflict."

Suggested Solutions

Effective UNSC Action, Decision Making, and Communication: UNCIP

The first step to addressing the conflict in a more effective way is to make use of the UNCIP more effectively and earlier than the UNSC did in July of 1948. This includes the providing of feasible details on the procedures for investigation in the status quo in its first resolution (resolution 39), the prioritization of the agenda among the UN's agendas, and the creation of a more detailed resolution at an earlier point in time. This would not only allow for the UNCIP to arrive before the Pakistan Army begins pushing Indian troops, but would also allow for both nations to be less reluctant towards the call for a ceasefire and withdrawal.

If delegates wish to maintain the UN's initial plan to implement the plebiscite if at all, a paramount measure to be considered in the process of earlier action and different decision making by the UNCIP is an improvement in communication within the SC, between the UNCIP and nations, and between the nations, before and during the intervention. For instance, there should be a concrete set of instructions and detail on the procedure and purpose for demilitarization and plebiscite in resolving the dispute that is provided to the nations, which will have been discussed and agreed upon within the UNCIP beforehand, as well as a means for India and Pakistan to communicate to one another and the UNCIP regarding said plebiscite. Regardless of whether the plan for plebiscite is abolished or not, the UN should undeniably be open to embrace other ideas besides the plebiscite; it should not rely solely on the

⁴⁹ Living Media India Limited. "Egypt bats for Kashmir dialogue, wants deeper ties with India." India Today. Last modified March 23, 2018. Accessed July 11, 2022.

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/egypt-bats-for-kashmir-dialogue-wants-deeper-ties-with-india-1196317-2018-03-23.

plebiscite as the only solution to the conflict. This would prevent the constant suggesting of varying, ineffective solutions and thereby avoid confusion, skepticism, and disinterest from both nations.

Finally, the UNCIP should continue to prioritize the issue in the later stages of the conflict, maintaining discussion, appointing representatives, and potentially imposing sanctions if necessary, ultimately avoiding reluctance to the agenda in its entirety. Delegates are also encouraged to involve a third party throughout the process of resolution other than India and Pakistan; this could include Kashmari authorities and prominent political actors in Kashmir such as Maharaja Singh. In the case that an interview is conducted with Maharaja Singh, such discussions should be mentioned and elaborated upon in the resolutions pertaining to the UNCIP.

Action in the UNMOGIP

There is also a need to improve the UNMOGIP as a whole. The UNSC could create and pass a resolution pertaining to the development of the group's role throughout the dispute. This development could prepare for a potential military intervention for the latter phases of the conflict by deploying armed troops instead of solely monitoring the ceasefire. This would prevent the UNMOGIP losing its value in the case that the plebiscite or ceasefire does not take place, and could involve the changing of its name in the first place. The resolution should detail a comprehensive plan including a concrete set of instructions given to all militias involved beforehand, proper strategic and ethical training of the peacekeepers, and specific measures to implement the plan. In addition, delegates should urge consistent communication within the SC before and during the intervention to ensure that all parties including SC member nations are fully aware of the situation and retain the information necessary to respond. If delegates do choose to modify the role of the UNMOGIP, they are advised to encourage the UNSC not to withdraw the peacekeeping troops from the war zone, especially when the armed conflict progresses in the following years.

Improvement in Safe Zones and Refugee Camps

In order to provide shelter and protection for Kashmiri citizens during the war and minimize the number of deaths and injuries, the UNSC should work to establish safe zones and refugee camps earlier on in the conflict. In this process, delegates should work to ensure the safety and protection of civilians within such camps and safe zones by militarily preventing attacks from both India and Pakistan. This could be achieved through means such as but not limited to deploying UN peacekeeping troops within

and around the established zones to actively prevent violence between the civilians and ensure that the Indian and Pakistani armies do not use aircrafts or artillery around such zones.

Furthermore, the UN should implement a system to supply humanitarian aid to the refugee camps through means such as receiving funds from organizations such as the UNCIP and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), working with the World Food Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO) to actively support medical, food, and water resources, and collaborating with local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as J&K Yateem Trust for staff.

Increase in Transparency And Publicity

As aforementioned, a notable failure from the UNCIP was its inability to publicize casualties and ultimately increase the transparency of the conflict to the global community. Thus, a solution that would allow the deployed UN staff to actively bring light to aspects such as war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law from both parties and prevent impunity without putting the humanitarian access at risk is imperative. This could be achieved by working in collaboration with organizations that were active from the 1950's and on such as the UNCIP, UNMOGIP, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and J&K Yateem Trust to collect and publish evidence of war crimes, as well as ensure the quantity and content of the information provided in the reports from staff. Such reports should compose accurate and unbiased statistics on the attacks and killings from the Indian and Pakistani armies, and should be effectively promoted to the public. There should also be a means to protect the reporting staff and potential journalists in Kashmir by working with NGOs such as Freedom House and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) to implement measures such as rapid response assistance. Delegates are encouraged to consider incentives for both governments to cooperate with the implemented solutions to an extent.

Establishment of Diplomacy Between India and Pakistan

The establishment of diplomacy between India and Pakistan is undeniably the most instrumental factor in ultimately achieving peace in the Kashmir region and signing a ceasefire to put an end to the conflict and achieve a different conclusion than India's brutal victories in the Kashmiri wars. Delegates should bear in mind the historical tensions and general distrust between India and Pakistan that could interfere with diplomatic attempts to reach a consensus during the meetings.

First, in order for a consensus to be reached, there should be a report that is collectively referred to during such meetings regarding the humanitarian aspect. This report could be created through an

arbitral claims tribunal by the UNCIP itself or organizations such as the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT.) They would work to collect evidence from verified witness statements and previous UN documents (depending on the time period that delegates wish to implement the aforementioned increase in transparency in), utilize such evidence to identify war crimes and violations of human rights from both India and Pakistan, reach a conclusion on the compensations of the victims such as the provision of federal subsidies by the government and the facing of trials from the perpetrators of the abuses, and publish a final report on all findings from the tribunal. Member nations will then be able to reference this report in individual meetings and peace talks to ultimately sign a ceasefire.

Additionally, a specific plan of implementation and consequences in the case that the compromises are broken for the aspects discussed during the meetings should be recorded to hold nations accountable for the solutions agreed upon, with continued monitoring from the UN or foreign powers such as SC member nations, depending on the delegates' stances on foreign intervention. In terms of the military aspect, the two parties could take measures such as setting a specific limitation or maximum amount for developing arms and ammunition for a period of time until a final ceasefire is signed.

Following the aforementioned peace talks, negotiations regarding the political state of and system within Kashmir that satisfies all parties should take place. Possible conclusions include the accession of Kashmir to either India or Pakistan, the creation of a joint body representing members from both parties in order to distribute political control, or the option of complete independence for Kashmir. Such processes could be monitored by third party watchdog organizations such as Election Watch.

Another approach for a diplomatic conclusion is requesting the UNDT or International Court of Justice (ICJ) to carry out a neutral arbitral boundary tribunal consisting of international experts to resolve the territorial dispute. This would involve providing a forum for India and Pakistan to be able to submit evidence of their historic claims to specific territories of the princely state and utilizing the collected evidence to write a final constitutive document yielding a conclusion on the distribution or accession of Kashmir. Delegates can use the tribunal as an alternative plan in the case that the peace talks and ceasefire do not prove to be effective, for the purpose of producing a report to be referred to in discussions between the nations, or as the foremost means of diplomacy. Delegates are also reminded that they can employ and better the initial plebiscite plan.

Implementation of Long Term Solutions

After the Kashmir conflict is resolved, the implementation of long term solutions to reconstruct the state for the future is vital. This includes an improvement in the healthcare system through methods such as working with the WHO and NGOs such as Doctors of the World to better aspects such as facilities, healthcare workers, and capacity for the future. Another solution would be to establish an infrastructure in which the organizations involved provide post-war financial aid for civilians in need (e.g. funds, food, clothes), prioritizing reparations for individuals heavily impacted by the war. Further, delegates can encourage More Economically Developed Countries (MEDCs) to assist Kashmir in developing social infrastructures such as their cybersecurity.

Delegates should also consider the economic cost of the war for India, Pakistan, and Kashmir, and take measures to provide consistent economic stability within the marketplace of the three states. This can entail working with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to implement a system involving unemployment benefits or the allocation of financial resources to businesses. All long term solutions would be a gradual process, as rushing to execute them in a short period of time is simply infeasible.

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